General

Mike Billington: Greetings. This is Mike Billington with the Executive Intelligence Review and the Schiller Institute. I’m very pleased to be today with Mr. M.K. Bhadrakumar, who had a 30 year diplomatic career for India. He was the ambassador to the USSR and also held leading positions within the Foreign Ministry. He had positions in Pakistan, in Iran, in Afghanistan. He is a prolific writer on world affairs. His blog is called India Punchline, which I encourage people to go to. Doctor Bhadrakumar, welcome, and thank you very much for agreeing to this discussion.

Dr. MK Bhadrakumar: Mike, good evening. It is my privilege, entirely my privilege. I have known and I have read a lot about you in your distinguished career as an activist and a promoter of world peace. But I never had an opportunity to sit face to face with you, so it’s a privilege. I have a small correction. I was not ambassador to the Soviet Union. At that time in the diplomatic service, I served twice in Moscow, at the time of Brezhnev and at the time of Gorbachev. When I finished my second term, I was just becoming a minister counselor. I retired from Turkey as Ambassador.

Mike Billington: Let me begin by noting that your most recent essay on the India Punchline website was on the extraordinary re-establishment of diplomatic relations between the US and Russia, with the phone call between Putin and Trump and then diplomatic meetings between several of their associates. What are your thoughts on how that’s going so far?

Dr. MK Bhadrakumar: I suppose I can see, in the limited time that President Trump has been in the Oval Office –he’s in the second month into his presidency. My feeling is that much ground has been covered, though it’s too early to say what the future trajectory is going to be, because there are very many variables in the situation. The Russian-American relations have a long history. If you go back to the time of President Eisenhower, there were very high hopes at that time that he and Nikita Khrushchev might work out an understanding for peaceful coexistence. But you know how abruptly it ended. On both sides, there are forces, as far as I can see, who may not be happy with what is happening today. But I trust President Trump to be assertive in his second term. He has a wealth of experience from his first term and would have held a perspective on why he couldn’t achieve what he had wanted, in foreign policy, how he got constrained. How he couldn’t proceed with that. I see traces of that already, the way he’s going about his second presidency. So I expect him to be assertive.

But a new factor has come in, which is this, that unlike in the Soviet times, the Soviet period, where the variables actually were with regard to the United States primarily, but here it is also with regard to the United States and transatlantic allies. It’s a   new factor. Britain apart, I think the other European powers were quite inclined to get on with the USSR, especially Germany, The gas pipelines were set up in the 60s, early 70s, despite reservations from the United States.

So there is now a kind of role reversal here. The United States is pushing for this cooperation with Russia, and from the statements in Moscow, I have come to a feeling that there is a level of transparency already existing in the dialogue, backchannel dialogue communications that are going on between the two sides. President Putin’s remarks last Thursday while addressing the Collegium of the FSB, which is the collegium of the top officials in foreign intelligence. He was optimistic, actually. I have never seen in the recent years such a ray of hope that he was holding out. Of course, he cautioned at the end, and he did so rightly, that there are forces who may be working to undermine this process, and therefore utmost vigilance is required. He was telling the Russian intelligence apparatus — we saw evidence of it already in the subsequent couple of days, Friday, Saturday, Sunday, the dramatic events in the Oval Office when Zelensky came to Washington. then the meeting of 18 countries hosted by the UK, including Zelensky and their determination to pursue their own pathway in Ukraine, no matter the dialogue between Russia and the United States.  I find also that the American media is playing a very negative role.

The mainstream media — there are other voices, voices of reason. But I cannot understand, I cannot comprehend why there should be such a fear about dialogue. I saw an interview given by the Secretary of State [Mark Rubio] where he asked this, very directly, forthright, “what is wrong with dialogue? You engage even your adversaries in dialogue. Why should you be terrified about it?” But that is the way it is. The discourses in the US are going on.

We don’t know much about the discourses in Russia. I don’t think it will be coming out into the open, as assertive in the way that it is being asserting in the European capitals and in the United States. There are hard liners there also. But I think the Russians are more in control of the situation. And if Trump persists with this trajectory, I think there is a strong likelihood that it can gather momentum. Let us see how far the normalization of diplomatic relations go. The resumption of activities of the embassies, which is very important, because a sustained conversation, dialogue, is only possible if the embassies are functioning full throttle. It’s not simply a matter of consular services and so on. It’s a matter of vital importance at this time that both countries are able to optimally perform on the diplomatic track.

Mike Billington: Do you have an opinion on the Russian Ambassador who has been appointed?

Dr. MK Bhadrakumar: The Russians, I think, have chosen a thoroughbred professional, with very deep experience in handling North America, North American matters [Ambassador Alexander Darchiev]. They proposed the name quite a bit earlier, about a couple of months back, and they were waiting for the agreement from the American side. And when the representatives met in Istanbul, the officials of the two sides last week, the agreement was formally conveyed to the Russian side. He’s a very solid professional diplomat, and is in a position to roll up his sleeves and work from day one once he arrives there. And I can understand that they have a lot of work to do, because they were denied any opportunity to communicate with the American public, at the people to people level. And that is very important, because a nonsensical narrative is there in America.  All kinds of things.   It’s almost like when George Orwell wrote about matters that he could have been referring to a situation like in the Western world today. A kind of contrarian view is blocked — it’s absolutely censorship — even American writers and thinkers, their point of view is not coming through. And a lot of people were actually writing to me and asking me whether I could communicate to them some Russian commentaries. Even the Russian point of view was not available to the American public. So reaching out to the American public will be a top priority for the new Ambassador. I’m sure about that.

Mike Billington: Let me ask you about the opposition to this process. I was quite impressed by the fact that you referred to both Obama and Joe Biden, you used the phrase that they were guilty of “wanton acts of motiveless, malignity and hubris.” Now, that’s quite a phrase. But what I’m interested in is to what extent you think there is a British hand behind those policies, and in general, those of the so-called “deep state.”

Dr. MK Bhadrakumar: Oh, there’s no doubt about it. It’s not to what extent– It’s an all pervasive influence. The British influence on the American policy — and often I think from the American side, they were led to believe — and Britain has the skill to get the Americans to believe — that it is their own policy! But it is scripted and it is thought through first in London and handed over. It’s almost like leading from the rear. This has been a consistent characteristic of British diplomacy.  For Britain, the entire stature that it has in the world depends on its indispensability for the American policies and American foreign policy strategy. And therefore, you can see the centrality of it in the British side of things. America is a global power. There are many countries which are willing to work with it. But in the case of Britain, it’s not like that. It’s an obsessive thought. And this was very evident in the last week — the panic that is there.  It’s going to be a very major negative factor in the coming weeks and months because the British intelligence has a stranglehold on the regime in Kiev. And now France also joined there. I saw a commentary by CNN earlier today discussing the possibility of, the ouster of Zelensky. We are getting into very sensitive issues now, and British intelligence is doing a lot of havoc.  Most of these acts of terrorism on Russian soil were actually planned by British intelligence. And the Russians knew that also — the missile attacks, targets inside Russia, assassination plots, such other things. Since yesterday, there has been talk that that Ukrainian intelligence might have been involved in the second failed assassination attempt on President Trump, candidate Trump, during the campaign. This is something which was articulated by top senior Ukrainian politicians even at that time, that this is all a doing of these people. But who  trained the Ukrainian intelligence? The Ukrainian intelligence is completely in the hands of MI6, and therefore, Britain’s influence is not at all a positive factor in the situation today. It’s one of the single biggest negative factors, Britain’s, capacity to be a spoiler.

Mike Billington: We met Mr. Starmer’s visit to Washington this past week with a major flier, a four-page piece which basically called for an end to the “Special Relationship” between the U.S. and the UK. It reviewed the several hundred years-long role of the British in undermining the efforts of the American Founding Fathers, and then the intervention in the war in 1812, as well as in the Civil War, trying to disrupt and destroy the United States as a sovereign nation, and then trying to subvert it when they failed to do it militarily. And the subversion is what you’ve just described. It’s basically their ability to — I like the way you put it, to convince Americans that these policies are their own when they actually come directly from British Intelligence. So, of course, Mr. Starmer went back, acting as if it was a successful trip. But I think it was a failed trip. And then he embraced Zelensky and sponsored this meeting at 10 Downing Street, which also failed to achieve anything significant, especially since Europe itself is now crumbling economically and falling apart in terms of any kind of unity within the EU or within NATO even for that matter. So where do you see Europe going at this point?

Dr. MK Bhadrakumar: Even Britain’s capacity to fill in if the United States drifts away, doesn’t have a role any longer in the Ukraine war, as it has had during the Biden presidency. Britain has no capacity to fill in. It has a standing army of around 60,000 soldiers. I read somewhere recently that its entire inventory of battle tanks works out to a mighty total of 25 tanks. So what kind of peacekeeping role can it perform in Ukraine? Within a week they will become victims of the meatgrinder. It has been a war of attrition. I don’t think that Europe can play a significant role, except if it realizes the wrong trajectory that it took in 2022, and played a happily subaltern role. Whatever Biden wanted, they did, and they have paid a very heavy price as a result of it. Germany is the biggest example. As I told you, I have lived in Russia, and have seen the kind of relationship that Germany had with Russia. Very frankly, Putin was discussing Germany as the next superpower. And where is it today?  Putin has stated publicly. There were some thousands of German companies who were operating there, and Germany’s export industry was very heavily dependent on the energy supplies from Russia. Putin once disclosed that the energy, the gas supplies, were given at subsidised prices to Germany.

The Russians knew that it was a subsidised price, and the Germans bought a lot of it and sold it in the European market at marked up prices. And the Russians knew that also! So you see such a close relationship was there.

Now, the entire production relations in the German economy is totally derelict. The export industry is not going to be competitive with the kind of prices they have to pay for importing gas and oil from outside. So I do not think that the new government that is coming into power in Germany after the recent elections to the Bundestag — I have lived in Germany. I know the potency of the constituency which rooted for the transatlantic relationship. But, today, the new chancellor designate, if he makes it as a CDU leader, he has spoken against the United States and he has spoken about a future for Europe that does not count on solidarity with the US, that does not count on support from the US and so on.

But I don’t think this is the final word, because Germany is in very serious trouble. From that high pedestal where it was four years, five years back, as more than half a superpower already. The economy is in recession, very deep recession.

I saw the FT, the Financial Times, had a report three days, four days back that already there is a talk about an American role in repairing the Nord Stream pipeline. I don’t know if you have heard about it or not — the pipeline which Biden had destroyed. If that comes, then it’s a very interesting proposition. Russia has abundant supplies and massive quantities of gas and oil can flow from there again. An American company managing that transaction on the ground, and the German economy again reviving, with plentiful gas supplies from Russia. So I don’t think Germany is going to be comfortable with the kind of trajectory that Britain and France are promoting. Italy is also, from what I see from odd statements here and there, one can always discern there that Italy is also very uncomfortable with this. What are the other countries which can play a role in replacing the United States, to mentor Zelenskyy and his people there? So I don’t think the Europeans are on the right track, I think they are on a very wrong track. And if you see the known unknown, there is also a factor there — that is, that a lot of it is a power struggle. There has been a power struggle in Kyiv. And if and when this comes out — people were holding back Zelensky’s rival camp, you know, holding back because they were nervous that any kind of effort to replace him would not have support from the United States.

But now, if the United States just cuts him loose and goes its own way, and says, “you manage,” then those forces will come up. And I don’t think the British intelligence can control that kind of a situation, because Russia has — I’ve lived in that country, I’ve traveled in Ukraine, and Russia knows that country like the back of its hand. Russia has its eyes and ears open there, even while the war is going on. If changes of that kind do take place, and I can only hope — I have written that also —  that it doesn’t take a violent turn.  But if that kind of a change takes place, then how does Europe address the situation, an emergency situation like that?

Whereas I think that both Putin and Trump are comfortably placed. They can build up the bilateral relationship between Russia and the United States. And I think Trump’s line, his political line is a very smart one. It’s based on smart thinking, that there is nothing to lose and everything to gain. So it’s a matter of sitting out, and that at some point some other side will give way. This is the way I see it.

Mike Billington: Let me go back to the US. You said in another one of your reports that I read that it was, in your words, that “it’s immaterial that the Trump administration is packed with pro-Israel figures and hard liners on China, for it is Trump that will be calling the shots.” What is your basis for that judgment?

Dr. MK Bhadrakumar: I’ll tell you. I never believed in this “Russia collusion” thesis, hypothesis, during Trump’s first term. I don’t know, Mike, whether you have seen a paper which I have in my collection, a one page advertisement, a full page advertisement in The New York Times, a paid advertisement by a young man in his 30s by the name of Donald Trump. I don’t know if you’ve seen it. Dated 1980 or 81. When President Reagan was elected. You know what he had written there? We both have passed through that stage in life. And I’m sure you’ll agree with me that at that time when you were in your mid-30s, you know what you’re talking about, in your adulthood. Now, he has written there, strongly arguing, that this kind of a collision course with the Soviet Union is unwarranted, that Russia is not an enemy country, and peaceful coexistence is possible, and arms control is a necessity. It’s an imperative need, arms control. And he offered his own services. This young, obscure businessman from New York offered his own services to be an envoy, a presidential envoy, to work on this. I think you know, the Democrats have done a great injustice by caricaturing this man. He’s a man of convictions. I was stunned when I read it that he could have written this when he was in his 30s, you know, mid 30s.

And what he is saying today, it occurs to me, are almost exactly the same thing. No change in that. I can only conclude as an outsider who doesn’t have an emotional reaction towards him, that he is a rational thinker, and also that what he is saying is based on convictions. Putin said the other day that Trump is a “very transparent person.” Putin said it, and Putin said that it’s very difficult to be like that. Putin said it, but that’s what it is. So this camp of liberals, globalists, the neo cons in the American setup, who provided the political cover for the deep state, they have done a great injustice to the political discourses in the US. And they were singularly responsible for creating all these kinds of things — Ukraine, the expansion of NATO, starting from that time, from Bill Clinton’s time. All these are legacies of those people, that camp, and now they are hell bent, despite the mandate — a powerful mandate that a person has got — and he didn’t rig the election. He has a genuine mandate and a very strong mandate. And nonetheless, they are not giving up. They are trying to undermine it. What is it?

Mike Billington: What’s your view of Putin in light of what you’ve said about Trump and Putin?

Dr. MK Bhadrakumar: What I tell you may surprise you, Mike.  Putin in my assessment was a “Westernist” in the sense that, someone who believed that Russia’s interests are best served by having a very strong relationship with the Western world and a mutually beneficial relationship with the Western world, but with certain guardrails. Putin’s problem is also this, that Putin is a trained professional intelligence officer. He has said openly that he saw the evidence that the United States helped the insurgents in Chechnya. He leveled this allegation publicly, and the Americans failed to respond. He volunteered even that he could produce good evidence to show that there was direct involvement by American intelligence in the war in Chechnya. Despite that, he was willing to work for a stable, predictable, mutually beneficial relationship, because he was convinced that it is important for Russia’s own development, in terms of technology, in terms of trade, in terms of the standard of living of the Russian people, all that taken into account. So if he is replaced, it is going to be a tremendous loss of opportunity, actually, for the United States. While he is there, therefore, what I am recommending is that the Trump administration should make the fullest use of it, this period, and to go ahead, because you have an interlocutor in Moscow, a very powerful interlocutor in Moscow who can get almost any kind of decision taken there. He is not a dictatorial man. There is a collegial spirit in the Kremlin, and they are all people who are known to him, who formed the National Security Council — the present day Politburo. He can carry them along.  Therefore, this period should not be wasted, because, you may not have a person of this kind of stature, experience, who has handled so many presidents across the Atlantic, and, who is innately, intrinsically open to having a relationship with the West. I think that his assignment in Germany was a very formative experience for him. He is a fluent German speaker, so all this could be working to the advantage of Trump.

It will be somewhat audacious on my part to say this, but I have a feeling that Trump means what he says, that Putin can be an interlocutor for him. He believes in it, that there can be a partnership possible.

Mike Billington: Russia and India have had a long, very close relationship, maybe with some troubles here and there. But in both cases, relations between India and China and between Russia and China are extremely important in the current volatile situation that the world is in. What is your view about this three-way relationship between Russia, China and India, the three key countries in this new BRICS alliance and the leadership of the global South.

Dr. MK Bhadrakumar: The troubled relationship with China is working to the disadvantage of India, especially in the present day times, because China is a huge reality, geopolitical reality, and it’s an immediate neighbor. Not having a conversation with China –the kind of line that India adopted in the most recent years, I think, was a very flawed policy. My personal opinion about it is that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, India could have taken a route like what Yeltsin took vis-a-vis China: China–Russia reconciliation. Russian Federation reconciliation came after China began to know that Russia has a strategic autonomy. If India also had behaved that way– the US–India relationship has been a very big handicap for India. There’s a contradiction there. The relationship with the United States is extremely consequential for India. And as far as the Indian elite is concerned, this is an indispensable relationship for India, and therefore in the post-Cold War era, right from the 1990s, India pursued a policy which was almost, one can say, US centric. But one template of it was that the United States gave an impression to India, and sections of Indian opinion also came to believe, that the United States is looking at India as a  counterweight to China.

I don’t think the United States had any illusions about India’s weaknesses, and that India could never be a counterweight to China, because there’s such a disparity in the comprehensive national power of the two countries. But a section of Indian elite believed that. Then, of course, the United States was an interested party, to kind of invidiously fuel the China-India tensions, mutual suspicions and so on. This became a very negative factor in China-India relations, because for China, any kind of tendency on the part of the Indians to align with the United States — though, of course, China has a very good, awareness that in the final analysis, India will follow an independent foreign policy. And India cannot in any way be regarded as an ally of the United States working against China. Chinese commentators openly write about it, but they had their own anxieties and concerns as the US-Indian relationship began to gather momentum. It’s a very strong relationship. There is a bipartisan consensus in the United States.

India is one of the few countries, perhaps, which can make a very smooth transition from the Biden presidency to the Trump presidency, and without any kind of hiccups. Even close allies of the United States, as we have seen in Europe or Japan or Australia, have problems in coming to terms with the Trump presidency, but we don’t have anything of that kind in India.

So you see, India is very well placed that way. But this has been a negative factor. But now, having said that, let me also add a caveat here, that I think that the Trump presidency will be good for India, because Trump has no reason, in fact, to  act as a spoiler in the India-Russia relationship, which is very vital for India. Biden tried it,            but that is not a worry that India has anymore. And similarly, Trump also, I don’t think he will work to fuel the tensions between India and China. Not openly, but even in a quiet way. I don’t think he will do that. So India, speaking that way for the first time, is in a position to pursue its relationship with Russia. And if the Russian-American relations improve, and there is going to be content in the relationship, especially on the economic side and so on, India may even try to get a share of it, may like to join that, because here the Indian’s focus is ultimately in terms of access to technology, trade, and the issues of development. There you see the predicament, which is this, that India doesn’t have a strong manufacturing industry. India’s growth is primarily in terms of the services sector. Infrastructure is developing. Infrastructure development is picking up momentum, but it’s a long way to go. So in these areas, United States cannot help India. It is the Chinese experience which will be relevant for India. I’ve been strongly advocating that no matter the differences with China, India must tap into China’s rise and create synergy for India’s development.

The border problem has to be set aside, Mike, what is often not understood is that this is not a territorial dispute between India and China. Why is it intractable? It is intractable because this is about the creation of a border where no border existed, either on paper or in political reality! So there are vast vacant spaces in the Himalayas, where, no one is in a position to claim that this has been part of India. So both sides are having their own claims, and it’s a question of agreeing to create a border.

You can imagine how difficult it is. And as now the countries have picked up momentum as regional powers, national prestige always comes into play, public opinion comes into play. So it’s going to be very difficult. India has to have a leadership which understands this, that the border dispute is not going to be settled easily, and it may take a long time. But meanwhile, mutual confidence and, in terms of India’s self-interest, it is useful to have a strong relationship with China.

One more point I need to mention is this, that in the   final analysis, the fact remains that there are common interests for India and China as rising powers in today’s international order. They both are staking claim to have a voice at the decision making level in the international financial institutions, for example. They have a common interest in that. So they are both ambitious about their role in the coming decades, well into the 21st century. The Chinese commentary is often right about this, that if we work together, it has a multiplier effect, and that can be a game changer for both. But if you do not work together, then both are losing.

Mike Billington: I’d like to ask you to address the situation in the Middle East, but I’d like to approach it through Iran. I think you were Ambassador in Iran, or you worked in Iran.

Dr. MK Bhadrakumar: Well, Yes, I have. I have a long experience on Iran, right from the time of the Islamic revolution. Yes, I mentioned to you my postings at headquarters, I handled only Iran-Pakistan-Afghanistan. I had no other charge. It’s a very important division in the Indian Foreign Ministry. All very key relationships.

Mike Billington: But I think you’ve mentioned in other writings that you’re confident that Trump will not be drawn into Netanyahu’s effort to have a US-Israeli war on Iran. What do you think about Iran’s role today, not just in the Middle East, but their role internationally?

Dr. MK Bhadrakumar: Iran is on the cusp of change.  Although there are, I know, people in the US who understand this, but the old stereotyped notions are still dominating in the US. I went to Iran as an observer during the 2024 presidential election. I met people whom I have known from earlier times –for a long time, I interacted with them and talked with them, and I came away distinctly with an impression that Iran is going to change, and since then there is much evidence pointing in that direction. The problem here is that, just as we spoke about Britain, a similar kind of a pernicious influence is there from Israel. Israel will not allow a kind of normalization, which would have been useful for both the United States and Iran. But in my opinion, there again, we could see some interesting changes. The bottom line there is, I think, Trump is genuinely averse to wars, especially getting involved in wars, deploying the United States forces in a war in an outside country to defend another country’s interests. So if that holds good through this next four year period, what is the way that it can develop if there is no war? Naturally, the United States will not decouple from Israel. Israel is hugely influential in the United States in terms of media, Congress, the political elite, think tanks and so on. So that will not change, the so-called Israel lobby — that relationship will continue. But, I have a feeling that at some point, if it has not already taken place during Netanyahu’s visit to the US, I think Trump will convey to him, someone will get them to understand that if they embark on something of an adventurous policy towards Iran, in terms of a conflict, then don’t count on him to step in and fight for Israel, fight Iran, for its interests. You see, a thing which is difficult for the Americans to understand is also this, that I have no doubt in my mind that Iranians are not interested in a nuclear weapon. And however much they try to say this, what option has been left to them in terms of when it comes to their enrichment? The United States pulled out of the JCPOA. Iran had fulfilled its obligations fully. Nonetheless, the United States did not deliver. Then it tore up the agreement and said that it will go for a “maximum pressure” policy. Sanctions remained. None of the sanctions were lifted.

So what is it that one could expect the Iranians to do? They went back to the drawing board and their enrichment continued. And they have now come up to a point that they are a threshold state. Now, still, I don’t think that they will go for — and it’s not a question of thinking. I know the Iranian mind on this. They do not think that nuclear weapons gives them any additional deterrent capability.  So they have developed their deterrent capability in other directions. We both can agree that that capability is very credible today, in terms of their missile capabilities and so on. A war means it will be to the detriment of Israel, which is a much smaller country ultimately. And unless the United States came into it, it’s a much smaller country. And I think Israel will be completely destroyed if there is a confrontation, military confrontation. And I feel that, Netanyahu is also ultimately a realist, and he should be knowing this. But the rest is a matter of rhetoric and grandstanding that is straining at the leash to go for a war and so on. But I don’t think it will happen because he knows it. He knows that Iran’s capabilities are today at such a level that there will be no winners in such a war, and Israel will be destroyed in the process.

Besides, I think that Trump definitely would have conveyed this to Netanyahu, if not directly then through others. Witkoff was there 2 or 3 times, he would have conveyed that: “Look, do not do anything.” And much of Trump’s own grandstanding with regard to the “Riviera of the Middle East” and so on in Gaza, I think it’s a matter of publicly posturing that the American backing for Israel is very solid. But that has its limitations. That cannot be logically taken to mean that the United States will align with Israel to fight a war against Iran. My understanding, after conversing with very influential people in Tehran during my last visit in June, is this: that they also do not think that there is going to be a war between the United States and Iran. Of course, the Iranians were all along contemptuous about the Israeli threats to attack because they know that Israel doesn’t have that capability without the United States. When you add up these tendencies, which are there for us to see, if you rationally look at the situation without Pride and Prejudice, then what is the result that you get out of it? That Iran can make an interlocutor for the United States.

And in the present situation, a new factor has also come in there, that the old American strategy of creating an anti-Iran front in that region, with Israeli participation in it, to isolate Iran, that is not going to work. You know, the Iran-Saudi rapprochement brokered by China has brought about a sea change in the regional climate, so much so that, it is doubtful if any of these countries would want to be seen as siding with Israel or the United States in the event of a war with Iran.

The third thing is this, that there is a Saudi factor. Saudi Arabia is also undergoing profound changes. And we must see that.  It continues to be an important ally of the United States. That is because it is playing its diplomatic cards very carefully. But it has diversified its relationships, and it has a very strong relationship today with Russia. It began with the creation of this brilliant idea of OPEC-plus, where they have aligned to influence the world market conditions, oil market conditions.  And with China, they have a strong relationship again.

So you see Saudi Arabia today is a very different Saudi Arabia. The most important thing about the Saudi approach to life now in regional politics is this: that the traditional attitude of using the militant Islamist jihadi forces as geopolitical tool, they have ended that, they are not in that business anymore. Now, this is a sea change. This has brought about a sea change in the situation in the Middle East. And this young man, the crown prince Mohammed bin Salman, is genuinely a moderniser.  I know there’s a lot of demonizing going on about him in the US, in the Biden period. But I think that he is a moderniser. And he is, like the Iranians actually, what is happening,  that  they are now moving in the same direction, giving primacy to economic growth and development. Iran also has a serious problem, an economic crisis. So they want to move also in the direction of greater trade, greater regional cooperation and so on. So what does it mean? This means that there are no takers in that region, if you want to pursue an inimical strategy towards Iran, be it the United States or Israel. If they want to do that, they are on their own.

This was not at all the case in all these decades that we have passed through. So all this creates a very favorable setting. But let’s see, I have a feeling that there will be an engagement between Trump with Iran at some point, sooner rather than later. He’s only been there for a little more than a month. But this can happen. Maybe this can happen. That will be a very historic development in the Middle East situation.

You see, ultimately, your people do not understand that this is a self-made man, Trump. I am looking at it as an outsider. I’ve never met him nor have I ever talked to him or anything like that. But he is a self-made man, and such people, self-made men, are hugely ambitious. When they have made it big, they become hugely ambitious about their own legacy. This is particularly an American strain. He will be looking at these issues as legacy issues. Russia, Iran and so on. Now you may laugh at it. I can already see a smile on your face. But you know, the fact of the matter is that what he is doing is nothing really short of a revolution. Like Vladimir Lenin said, you can’t make an omelet without breaking eggs.

Mike Billington: We’ve reached our one hour. But if you don’t mind I’d like to ask you one further issue.

 Dr. MK Bhadrakumar:  Sure, Sure.

Mike Billington:  And that is our Oasis Plan. I don’t know if you’ve looked at this, but this is a plan that Lyndon LaRouche authored way back in the 1970s, which was based on the idea that the real problem in the Middle East, if there was going to be peace, there had to be a concrete development policy which would address the water crisis as well as the energy and transportation and basic infrastructure. The Oasis Plan is a very ambitious idea of building canals, of building nuclear desalinization in order to create huge quantities of fresh water from seawater, and other kinds of infrastructure development, not just for Gaza, but for the whole region, extending out into Iraq and Iran and so forth. I’m wondering what your view of that is. We’re trying to intersect this policy debate now as powerfully as we can, into the discussions that are taking place because of the Gaza crisis.

Dr. MK Bhadrakumar: I think Trump would be interested in this. Logically, Trump would be interested in this. The United States has a handicap. Why is it said that its influence is steadily draining, is losing its capacity in the region. It’s a paradox, but Iran is actually American’s natural ally in that region. The Iranian elite is, again, distinctly pro-Western, and that country is performing today much below its optimal level. It has a huge population, massive land mass and powerful agriculture, a well-developed agriculture base. If only it is allowed to bring out its LNG and gas to the world market, it has a huge reserve. So you see it can be of use and all these things become possible. But so long as that doesn’t happen — how do you realize these dreams? — they will remain on paper. Because I don’t think any country there has got the kind of intellectual resources, absorption capacity for technology, and the national will and purpose in this way that Iran has. Trump will certainly be attracted towards this if an engagement takes place. I strongly suggest that you should promote an engagement, a constructive engagement between the United States and Iran. And this would be in some ways, I tell you, this would be even, I would say, as significant as the normalization of the Russian-American relationship. It will be in America’s interests.

Mike Billington: Very interesting. And thank you very much. I appreciate your taking the time. Your views on these things are very stimulating and insightful, and I think it will lead to further discussion, within our organization and with our associates around the world. I thank you. Do you have any final words you’d like to say?

Dr. MK Bhadrakumar: Mike, I thoroughly enjoyed our conversation. I have a sneaking suspicion that we are probably on the same page in the sense that you know you are. I didn’t expect that you would be so receptive to these thoughts, which I projected. So what does it mean? It means that there are thoughtful people in the US, who understand these things. And I think, therefore, you should use your influence, to work on some of these areas. And the Trump presidency, take it as a golden opportunity. And do not be misled by your own people there, your own think tanks and media, mainstream media and so on. He’s opened a gateway, a pathway, through which, if the country can travel, it will be transformed phenomenally. I had never thought that this slogan of MAGA, you know, Make America Great Again, that it is anything but a pipe dream. But now I am beginning to feel that if he proceeds — i saw this morning, for example, the press conference by Trump announcing the $100 billion investment to make chips in Arizona from Taiwan. How often did you see these kind of things during the Biden presidency? So he is working overtime and he has a hugely ambitious agenda. Please do not handicap him by creating the kind of digressions and distractions and so on, as it happened during his First Presidency. This is the essence of democracy, that when someone has earned a legitimate mandate from the people — and what a mandate it is, such a strong mandate from the people, the American people — he got.  Then he should be allowed to govern because the people are going to get an opportunity after four years to go on the same path, or take some other path, which is what democracy is about. A peaceful transfer of power is no longer possible in your country. I find it is extremely frustrating.

Mike Billington: It’s like what many people are now saying about Europe, I think it was Vance who said the problem in Europe is not Russia or China — it’s that they no longer believe in the voice of their own people, that there’s no democracy anymore. And he pointed to Romania and the AfD.

Dr. MK Bhadrakumar: And I’m telling you, this is the problem in Europe — you hit the nail on the head. And this is also the problem in the United States. You see, this has to be like these people who are systematically undermining, decrying Trump. They should understand that to behave like adults and let the process of governance continue, discuss a policy but in objective terms, but leave it at that. Everything is not about winning elections. So now you see the plate is like this, that unless he is humbled and he is destroyed, the other side cannot hope to have a revival. It’s a zero sum mentality.

Mike Billington: Yes, exactly. The win-win idea, the idea of mutual collaboration and the respect of the other, from the Peace of Westphalia, is totally missing in this “unipolar” world mentality.

Dr. MK Bhadrakumar: Let me thank you. And I wish you all success in your endeavors. You know, you have had a very eventful life and you aspired for things which were not even humanly possible. So you had such dreams in your life. I admire you, and therefore I feel greatly privileged, that you spent this one hour with me alone in a conversation.

Mike Billington: Yes. Thank you very much. 

Feb. 19, 2025 (EIRNS)—EIR’s Mike Billington conducted an extensive interview today with Graham Fuller, which we transcribe in full below.

Billington: Greetings. This is Mike Billington with the Executive Intelligence Review and the Schiller Institute. I have the pleasure of interviewing today Mr. Graham Fuller, former long-time CIA official, including being the vice chairman at the National Intelligence Council at the CIA, responsible for long-term strategic forecasting. He’s also very much an expert on Arab issues, which we will mention during our discussion here.

Fuller: I just might mention Mike. I’ve also, from early days in my life, been very focused on Russia. I majored in Russian history and literature and language at Harvard. So I’m yes, a lot of Arab world stuff, but a lot in Türkiye, and in Hong Kong, in China for many years. It’s been a bit of a trip around the world.

Billington: Okay. So you’re a good person to have on because the whole world is changing very, very rapidly. So, I watched the joint interview that you did with Ray McGovern and Larry Wilkerson. In that interview, you said that the Arabs have been rather reserved in their support for the Palestinians, partially because the radical position taken by the Palestinians would tend to upset the kings and the emirs in the Arab world. But you also then said that the genocide of this last year has broken through some of that hesitancy and that the Arabs are coming together to support the Palestinians. Do you want to explain that process?

Fuller: Well, Mike, the ruling circles in the Arab world, and they’re all kings and emirs for the most part, have feared the revolutionary character of the Palestinian nationalist movement, which is essentially a national liberation movement and a movement seeking to free themselves and be more independent and under democratic rule. Furthermore, it’s a public movement. It’s a nationalist, emotional movement that Arab rulers fear because they don’t want people in the streets demonstrating on any issue, because it suggests people power in the streets, that one day could be the root of turning against the ruling circles themselves. So any kind of public agitation of that sort is not welcome. The Palestinians are the preeminent symbol of revolutionary change in the Middle East as are the Iranians, who are the other very feared state. It’s not that Arabs hate Persians, necessarily, but because the Iranians had a genuine revolution, a street revolution that we don’t see much of in the world anymore. They’re usually coups in the Arab world. But the Iranians, the Persians had a real revolution. And that scares the hell out of dictators and various authoritarians across the region. They may feel sorry for the Palestinians, but they don’t want mass agitation.

Billington: What did you mean when you said they’re starting to come together now, the Arab world?

Fuller: The outrage is that we’re all perceiving, in this genocide, this laying waste to the Gaza Strip, with Israel moving again, as they want to do, into Lebanon, into parts of Syria, annexing the Golan Heights—the real borders of Israel are known only to God because it’s all in the Bible. It all depends on how you interpret it. There are those Israelis and interpreters of the Holy Scripture that see signs that Israel, Greater Israel, has a place in parts of Saudi Arabia, going back to ancient days. Of course, Jordan is functionally, in many ways, a Palestinian state. It’s got a slight majority, a Palestinian majority in Jordan. Parts of Egypt have figured very prominently in Jewish history going way back. Nobody knows where Israel will stop when it’s in its expansionist mood, which is where it is now, and where its right wing certainly locates itself.

Billington: You have endorsed The LaRouche Oasis Plan which Lyndon LaRouche first devised back in the 1970s for a massive water and power development program for Palestine, but going beyond Palestine into the broader region. You’ve suggested in particular that such a plan should extend through Iraq and Iran and on into Afghanistan and Central Asia. What do you think about the Oasis Plan, and, in particular, what do you think would be the impact on the international discussion about the Mideast crisis if it were introduced as part of a peace plan for the region?

Fuller: I think you’re correct that it needs to be introduced as part of a broader peace plan. One of the reasons that, however fine an idea it has been, the fact is that the local rivalries and particularly rivalries projected by the United States in a Cold War mode has made regional cooperation all but impossible. I mean, Syria, for example, would need to figure quite seriously, or Iraq for that matter, the Tigris and Euphrates. All of these states would need to figure very seriously in any kind of regional water plan. But that’s been impossible when the United States has been at war with Iraq for a long time. In the past, Iraq was seen as the enemy. We can’t deal with Iran because they’re the enemy. Syria was seen as hostile to the U.S., so we couldn’t deal with Syria. In other words, the wherewithal of bringing these particular states together has not been there up to now. I think it’s only as you begin to see a motion, a movement towards broader regional cooperation that the water aspect, the engineering aspects, the power aspects, the social aspects, the political aspects really begin to come into play. The first very positive move in that direction, as you’re well aware, was that the so-called intractable hostility between Persians and Arabs, was essentially solved or mollified by Chinese intervention. A couple of years back, when they brought about a rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran, that was a remarkable event that many regional specialists would have said could never happen. So you can see the power of where serious political geopolitical thinking opens the door to the more practical aspects of broader regional water, agricultural, and hydrological projects. So I think maybe the day is getting closer when this project could be seen as feasible and manageable.

Billington: You brought up Iran. You suggested in that same interview I watched, you suggested that Trump, despite having been very critical of Iran, and ended the nuclear deal with Iran during his first term, but that nonetheless you say that if you compare this to his reaching out to North Korea’s Kim Jong Un during his first term, that Trump may be willing to make such a reconciliation with Iran. What makes you think that would be possible? And what do you think would be the result?

Fuller: Part of this involves Trump watching, which I think there’s no recognized expert of what Trump watching involves today. The whole world is watching with fascination. I mean, some people accuse Trump of having no principles, that it’s all me, me, me. That’s not altogether all bad, if Trump can see that.

If Trump finds gratification in having his name in lights, blazing lights, as the person who managed to bring North Korea and the rest of the world, or Iran and the rest of the world, into a more comfortable position, I think that’s great. Having him driven by ego to do those things would be superb. I was very impressed, as I think many people were, by what Trump tried to accomplish three times with Kim Jong Un, probably the most intractable problem and leader in the world. I think he might, well, he’s indicated a possible interest in taking on Iran. I think you and I and many people listening to this are well aware of the problems surrounding this, not least of all, is Israel. Israel treasures its hostility of Iran. It’s one of the reasons why Israel feels that it’s got to maintain a huge power, including nuclear power, and block any other power’s move towards nuclear, or even traditional military power on the part of Iran. So I think Trump is well aware that he would need to take that on. But hopefully, his desire for, adulation and for playing the role of a statesman could maybe overcome some elements of, Zionist and Israeli pressure, against any kind of rapprochement with Iran. But it’s key. Iran is key to the future of any kind of regional cooperation. And the Chinese, as I said, have opened the door by making a rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Tehran possible.

Billington: Right. The problem, of course, is that Trump just invited Bibi Netanyahu to Washington. He treated him with glory. He came up with this idea of taking over Gaza and clearing out all the Palestinians, an idea which is clearly impossible and a bit nuts. What do you think can get Trump to generally break from this extreme right-wing Israeli leadership? Even the open genocide of the last year, which you said has begun to bring the Arab countries together, appears not to have fazed Trump and his open glorification of this government in Israel.

Fuller: Israel is a very tough nut to crack, if you will, in the sense of trying to limit its extraordinary power over American foreign policy in all areas. Some have described the American Congress as “Israeli occupied territory.” Whatever we think about that. I think it was interesting that when Netanyahu came to Washington very recently, it was clear that he was taken off guard by Trump’s suggestion that the U.S. would take over Gaza and had its own plan for the development of a beautiful new “Riviera” in the area. Netanyahu looked like he was quite surprised by that. And in fact, Trump was really saying, “No, Israel, Gaza would no longer be yours. It wouldn’t be yours to develop. It would be ours to develop.” I’m sure that this kind of encounter with Trump on the part of Bibi suggests that Trump is not to be taken for granted, that he can come up with some bold, even crazy or startling or original concepts that Israel cannot bank on with any certainty. Secondly, if you think about the power of the Israeli lobby, it might be interested to consider whether Trump, being in his second term, that the Israel lobby is no longer able to exercise the same power as it can in the first term, simply because he can’t run for office again and maybe doesn’t have to depend on that kind of politics. When people like, Miriam Adelson had donated $100 million to Trump for running again and winning this time around. Trump can really in many ways pocket it and say, “Okay, but what have you done for me lately?” He’s not running for office again as a lame duck, then he may be a little less dependent upon Zionist money to win the next election, including Miriam Adelson’s willingness to buy Trump. Maybe it’s harder to buy Trump these days. I’m just throwing out some thoughts here, uh, as to what might possibly weaken the Zionist death grip on American foreign policy in the Middle East?

By the way, I don’t want to let this idea get lost. But it’s not just in the Middle East. I would suggest that the Ukraine issue is quite fundamentally tied in with this. The neocons, who are, of course, to a man and a woman totally supportive of Israel, are also very hostile to Russia, deeply and ideologically. If Trump is able to bring about, as it looks now possible, to bring about some kind of settlement of the Ukrainian issue, this removes a major ideological issue from the hands of the neocons in Washington. I do not think they would welcome that kind of improvement of relations between Moscow and Washington. So you can see, if there is a settlement of the Ukrainian issue, I think it would have a direct impact on the power of the neocons in Washington, which would have an obvious effect in Gaza and the broader issue of Israel and the Middle East. It’s just a thought.

Billington: As you know, the Russian and American core leadership had a meeting today in Riyadh in Saudi Arabia. Do you want to comment on what you saw in that meeting?

Fuller: I’m not privy to what really took place there, except the vibe seemed to be very good. The meeting went on reportedly for four hours, which is remarkable for any kind of initial diplomatic meeting of that sort. Really quite difficult issues. So there’s that, and the fact that both sides expressed deep satisfaction with the progress made so far. So I’m just very encouraged at that taking place, I don’t think anybody in any of the readouts following the meeting talked about the impact on the Middle East, but it’s certain they they’re bound to have talked about it, because Russia is quite involved in the Middle East, and Washington is deeply involved in the Middle East. The issue of Russia’s role in all of that is bound to have been part of the discussion between the American and Russian parties. So yes, there may be a trickle down, important trickle down effect from a willingness to talk. It’s pretty shocking, Mike, that Biden over three years was more willing to go to war and kill, you know, tens of thousands of Ukrainians rather than talk once to Putin about the conflict, on how peace could be arrived at. That’s because all they wanted to do—they didn’t care about Ukraine itself. The goal was to weaken Russia, bring Russia down, humble Russia. That’s why Biden wasn’t even willing to talk to them. Well, we have a very different world now when we see these senior representatives of both states willing to talk to each other on a broad range of issues, which should have taken place starting three years ago, but for the reasons we talked about, did not take place.

Billington: Right. So we also have this extraordinary development of Tulsi Gabbard becoming the Director of National Intelligence, somebody who has been very forthright and open, attacking the crimes of the FBI and the so-called deep state. She will be the person briefing Donald Trump every day as the Director of National Intelligence. As a former leader of the intelligence agencies, as you were, how do you expect this to function?

Fuller: A couple of points, Mike. First of all, there’s the serious question, an eternal question, that existed when I was running the long term estimates for the CIA. Who reads these things? Does the president read them? Which president reads them? Supposedly Obama had a deep interest in reading this kind of intelligence analysis and reporting. But I think Biden was less inclined to do so. Trump apparently doesn’t like really reading at all. George W Bush, apparently, according to the people who were sent to brief him, had limited interest in what the intelligence community had to say. George W Bush knew what he wanted to know, or believed. He knew what he knew, and so that was that. So I hope that Tulsi Gabbard might well have this president’s ear, because he played such a role in bringing her into her present position, but we just don’t know how much Trump is going to read into it, if he gets intelligence that is not what he wants to hear. Other presidents have this problem. They don’t want to get the bad news from the intelligence communities, from their reporting. Secondly, I don’t know how much influence Tulsi Gabbard personally—it’s part of the same issue—but, how much influence she’ll really have over Trump in this regard.

And she’s coming up against some other major big players. That’s all along been an issue. The Pentagon has its own intelligence organization and it has its own agenda. It has its own views of Russia. If you come in with a report that “peace is breaking out all over”—I’m not saying that that’s going to happen. But in the event that you have very positive vibes coming out of American and Russian encounters, the Pentagon might feel that some issues for them, maybe their own ox is being gored, or what is the voice of the huge mass of the American military industrial complex. That’s who feeds off hostility between Russia and the United States, or for that matter, Iran and the United States, or China and the United States. That’s grist for their mill. So they will be wanting to push back against voices that are maybe encouraging rapprochement and finding opportunities for closer cooperation between the United States and Russia.

So, yes, I’m very delighted that Tulsi Gabbard is there. I think she’s a very intelligent woman, strong morals and strong principled views on what’s going on in the world that hopefully will have a positive impact on the situation.

Billington: You might know that we published the pamphlet called “The Liars Bureau,” whose purpose was to encourage the members of the U.S. Senate to confirm Tulsi Gabbard, as well as Kash Patel as the FBI chief, by pointing out that the people we know well from the intelligence community over the last decade or more have tended to be massive liars. We pointed out the work of Dick Cheney, James Clapper, Mike Pompeo and others who promoted these illegal wars in Iraq and Syria and Libya and so forth, who manufactured the whole. “Russia, Russia, Russia,” Russia-gate hoax to drive Trump out of office, and more. How do you explain the sorry state of the U.S. intelligence agencies that we’re now facing we have to clear up?

Fuller: I was relieved, Mike, to see that I was not included among the members of the Liars Club, despite my many years in the CIA, both as an operations officer overseas and in terms of long range forecasting. I think, um, the real question again comes down to what kind of access and influence that the chief of intelligence will have over the president and his followers. Also, we have to remember that it’s not just a question of what the President believes, but the congressional opinions and views matter very heavily in this as well. We know that Congress is heavily bought and paid for. I mean, we all know the famous remark by Mark Twain that “America has the finest Congress that money can buy.” It’s hard to know how much congressmen who are bought and paid for by the military industrial complex or the Israeli lobby, how much they will be influenced by what a supposedly objective intelligence community is saying and how much money will speak to them. That’s, I think, one of the really key considerations.

And secondly, I would have to say over time, and I’ve had, you know, over 30 years or so, had a lot to do with the intelligence community. My sense is that it has become increasingly politicized over time, since when I first went in. Most of us junior CIA officers, most of us felt somehow that if we could just get the word back to Washington as to “what the real situation was,” that politicians would move and act appropriately in adjusting their policies. The real coming of age for young CIA officers is when you begin to find out that maybe what you thought was a great report from a great agent source in the Middle East or Russia or China or wherever else, maybe will reach the table of some important person, but will he or she really read it? Or more to the point, will they believe it? Or do they want to believe it? Or will they act on it? Those are all great unknowns. So these issues I think, have become more politicized. The appointments to top positions in the CIA have become more politicized over time. And that, I think, has greatly weakened and damaged the reputation of the CIA. And frankly, I’ve been quite shocked at many of the statements of CIA in recent years, especially in Ukraine, where seemingly not only the New York Times assured us every day that Russia was losing the war in Ukraine, that Ukraine had virtually won the war. But apparently CIA reports were telling the president the same thing. And Biden wanted to believe and wanted to hear it. So there we are.

Billington: Much of your career was focused on the Arab world. There’s now great discord in the Arab world over how to deal with the crisis in Palestine. Um, how are they responding to Trump’s call for the U.S. to come in and take it over and build Gaza?

Fuller: Well, I think I think first of all, the Arab world has been angry for some long time about the treatment of Palestinians and the expansion of Israeli power and influence in the region, and the assassination of leaders, one after another after another. Regional leaders, both Arab and Iranian. As I said earlier, the Israeli destruction, horrifying destruction, turning Gaza into something that looks like Berlin after World War Two, the tragic scenes of the human losses, of men, women and children in Gaza, has horrified the Arab world as it has horrified so much else of the world.

Secondly, I think now that much of Arab leadership—they may not love the Palestinians and may be afraid of political agitation on the part of Palestinians. But they can’t push back against that anymore. They’ve got to ride with it and support it. So I would say, they are far more willing to speak out now. Thirdly, I think there’s a sense among Arabs and especially Arab leaders to be really angry at the idea that Washington—and I’ll use a vulgarism here because it’s really accurate—that Washington is putting all its shit on top of the Arab leaders. Uh, you know, “We fucked up here, but you guys are going to have to take care of it. You’re going to have to take the Palestinians. You’re going to have to pay for it. We don’t want to have to get involved in that.” That really enrages the Arab world and the Arab leadership, the Muslim world and the regional leadership that sees America and Israel as fundamentally the source, the cause behind this, this tragic genocide in Gaza, which has been preceded by decades and decades of Israeli dominance, geopolitical dominance and military dominance over all Arab states. So I think we’ve seen—as Marx said, who used the term “quantitative into qualitative change”—the anger, I think, now has begun to turn into something quite different. I would not want to predict where it’s going to go, but I fear it’s going to result in far more violence. I happen to think that war between Israel and Iran now is more likely than ever before. One, because Bibi Netanyahu knows that his ability to stay in power depends on the perpetuation of war. And it’s part of the Israeli myth that Iran is our greatest enemy and that if we don’t crush it and destroy its nuclear capabilities, then we’re forever at risk. This is the mantra of Israel today, and a mantra that they’ve tried to impose on Washington thinking.

So I, I’m very, very nervous about the possibility of a war in which Bibi himself is working to try to draw the U.S. into such a war, to back it both militarily and diplomatically, across the board. I don’t think any Arab state really wants to go to war with Israel. I think they would know they their armies are not up to it, that they would suffer considerably, but they’ve got to show that they’ve got some cojones, let’s say, to demonstrate to their people that they’re not going to take infinite insults and injuries and disrespect from Israeli policies. I don’t see this going in any good direction, unless there’s a dramatic change in Palestine, in Gaza. For all Trump’s efforts, I don’t really see that happening now, and especially with the power of the Israeli lobby that still seems to be singing from the same hymn book. So I’m quite positive about Ukraine, but I’m not very positive about Palestine and Gaza, except for the fact that maybe an American-Russian rapprochement could begin to deliver some kind of regional settlement. But. Bibi will be dragged kicking and screaming every inch of the way against it. So that does not bode well.

Billington: Have you had the opportunity to see what the Egyptian plan is, which I don’t think has been made public yet, but are you aware of what they’re preparing, their plan for the reconstruction of Gaza?

Fuller: No. For one thing, Egypt is dirt poor at this point, barely surviving on many international handouts. I would expect that Egypt would make nominal efforts to contribute to some kind of Palestinian reconstruction, but it will really be nominal. They can’t afford it, but they can’t afford not to do anything. Trump indeed will tell the Arabs that they have got to come together and contribute to a rebuilding of Gaza. So I wouldn’t expect a lot of Arab states except the rich Gulf states that can afford it.

Billington: Right. You are well known as an expert on Türkiye in particular. I believe you’re also familiar with the Turkish language and that you’ve written a great deal about Türkiye and so forth. They are playing an increasingly important role in the region. What do you think about their role and how is it changing, and where is it heading?

Fuller: You’re quite right, Mike, that Türkiye’s role has been increasing in the Middle East, in the entire region. I would argue, at least 30 years now, since Erdoğan has been in power, Türkiye has said, “We’re not the old loyal NATO American ally, as you thought we were for a long time. We are the inheritors of the great Ottoman Empire, which spread out across huge areas, geographic areas of the world.” And so the Turks say: “We are not just a Mediterranean power. We’re a middle eastern power. We are a Muslim power. We are a Caucasian power. We are a Central Asian power. We are a Red sea power. We’re a North African power.” Türkiye is really playing at a very high level. Now, that would have been astonishing to think of some 30 years ago. I think the West and Washington in particular is quite uncomfortable with that, because it means that Türkiye now has become an independent actor. That must be taken into consideration independently of Washington’s own desires and plans. It’s not NATO. Türkiye as a NATO player is really almost irrelevant today. There’s some talk in NATO that Türkiye has become so contrary to NATO’s own wishes, that maybe they should throw Türkiye out. But I have commented that I think that NATO needs Türkiye more than Türkiye needs NATO.

I don’t think Türkiye is going to be expelled from NATO unless something truly egregious happens, like a Turkish attack on Israel. I would not put that, by the way, entirely out of the picture, because Türkiye came nearly to some sort of naval blows some years ago in the first conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, when Türkiye sent a flotilla of arms and food and other produce to the Palestinians across the high seas in what was called the the MV Mavi Marmara, the blue Marmara, operation, and the Israelis essentially shot it out of the water, refusing to allow them to deliver any of these goods to the Palestinians. I think there’s going to be increasing tension as Türkiye wants to up its ante, play a more and more important role. It’s quite striking that the two powers in the region that are really speaking out very strongly on the Palestinian Gaza issue Are not even Arab states, they are Türkiye and Iran. Neither of them are Arab. But they have more powerful arguments, more vehement arguments against, and speaking out more boldly against Israel than any of the Arab leaders, except for poor Yemen, which is really a dirt poor country. They are wonderful, generous, hospitable people, gutsy people. They are shooting. They’re playing way above, they’re punching way above their weight, by blocking Red sea shipping that are destined for Israel. But in any case, all I’m pointing out is, this is an extraordinary anomaly, that it’s not the Arab leaders, it’s the Persian and Turkish leaders that are moving this, driving this. And I think it is bringing many of these Arab leaders to shame in what they are not doing. So I again, I feel, have a very uncomfortable feeling that Arabs are going to feel they have to do something of a bolder nature than simply speaking out, mildly, as it has been. I think the speech has now gotten bolder. I wouldn’t be surprised if there’s some kind of bolder military or semi-military or quasi military action, on the part of some Arab states, Egypt, perhaps even Saudi Arabia, who are the only two states with real military power among the Arabs. Otherwise, no Arab states in the region have that kind of military power, and none of it, certainly not Egyptian power, is not up to taking on the Israelis at this point.

Billington: All right. Graham . Well, thank you very much. Is there any sort of closing statement you’d like to make or a message to our readership around the world?

Fuller: Yes, I might want to say, Mike. And I know that you and the Schiller Institute are very much on board with this message. I think we are in deeply consequential times. I have never seen such a dramatic geopolitical shift in my life, in my adult professional life, other than the collapse of the Berlin Wall, which changed the world in remarkable ways, and then the collapse of the Soviet Union, which changed it further. Both of which led to the emergence of the United States as the sole hegemon, global hegemon in the world. And the U.S. took that role accordingly aboard, and has been acting like the world’s sole global superpower that can do anything it wants, anywhere it wants, and expect other powers and countries to act accordingly according to American wishes. Those days are really on the way out. I’m hardly the only one saying that, but I think Washington as a country, as a government, is in denial. I think the United States is in denial, believing that it’s still the world’s sole superpower, the indispensable player and the most powerful nation in the world. All of these things are growing Increasingly unreal and increasingly dangerous to believe, to actually believe it, to act on on that basis. I’m heartened, frankly, that the emergence of other powers in the world that do not necessarily have to be enemies, can perhaps balance us in constant desire to be the sole superpower in the world that can call the shots all over the world. We are not able to do that. We have in numbers of states, like the BRICs nations, the grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, now joined by Saudi Arabia and Iran and many other candidate states that want to join this. This is a formidable new movement that I see as a latent or nascent, if you will, a nascent new UN organization. The UN has fundamentally, ever since its formulation, has been a gathering of formerly colonial powers that did run the world for the last hundred years, perhaps, and thereby was able to take the dominant position in the UN. Those days, I think, are disappearing. We have new voices, who have new interests, who do not want to be pushed around by Washington or Western Europeans economically or militarily or socially or politically or in any other term. We see now, I think, the recent move by Trump and by Peter Hegseth to tell the Europeans that essentially the game in Ukraine is over. What he is saying, basically, is the NATO game is over. And above all else, I think it is maybe starting to call for a rethinking of the source of global conflict in general.

Why do we have to have conflict? Is conflict inevitable among states? I’m going to make a criticism of John Mearsheimer here. I think John Mearsheimer is a wonderful observer and theoretician on global issues. His reading of Ukraine and his reading of Gaza is some of the best in the world. But John Mearsheimer also has this theory: the theoretical view of international relations that I cannot buy, and that I don’t even think is consistent with his own geopolitical views. He really understands Ukraine and Gaza, but not because of his own geopolitical ideas. I think he feels that if you’ve got two major powers that they have to conflict.

I just find this a very mechanical, and rather crude, frankly, view of the world. States, over the history of the world—Germany and France were at each other’s throats. France and England were at each other’s throats for hundreds of years. Russia and China were at each other’s throats. Russia and Germany and the U.S. were at each other’s throats. But the world changes. Time changes. Situations change. Other countries have agency. There’s no reason why the United States has to be at war, or find Russia to be our chief opponent or that we have to find China as our chief opponent.

This is a choice. We have choice, folks. We have decided that we want Russia to be our enemy, and our government feeds off that. Mike, you and I have talked about this. The military industrial complex loves war, the Pentagon loves it. But there is no reason why there has to be that kind of conflict. And essentially Hegseth, I think, was beginning to hint at that fact, that, “Look, we can sit down. We don’t necessarily have to go to war.” But when the United States spends most of its time in its foreign policy blocking people that it fears are enemies—of course, you’re creating enemies. You’re telling people “you are our enemy. You are a peer competitor.” That’s a threat to these countries, to tell them that kind of thing. What do you think? If I tell you, Mike, that, you know, you’re a nice guy, but you’re my enemy. You draw certain conclusions, you act accordingly. I think we need to rethink this, as to why we automatically have to be at war with other powerful countries in the world. And that goes for Russia. It goes even more for China.

I’m heartened that somebody like Trump or others—Jeffrey Sachs at Harvard often raises similar kinds of questions. These are eternal questions. Why do we have to have to go to war? The U.S. foreign policy essentially over the last decade has been nothing but “block Russia,”block China.” This is a world of suffering from all kinds of problems, of health and food and regional local conflicts. Et cetera, et cetera, that the United States should be spending most of its money and treasure and time and energy on identifying enemies to which we have to build the world’s biggest budget, uh, military budget in the world, more than all the other countries of the world put together, more or less. This is not a very constructive or imaginative American foreign policy.

So I don’t want to go on about this further. I think the point is clear, but I’m heartened that, for whatever Trump’s strange or disturbing views on many American domestic issues, we’re three weeks into this guy’s policies. We have a long way to go, but I am heartened to see that some questions that nobody has bothered to ask for years are now being raised by this administration. You can call the questions crazy or maybe long overdue. They’re both. But it’s time to have a real shift of paradigm. And I see glimmerings of that now. And I’m heartened by that.

Billington: Right. Not only stop blocking them, but join them. I mean, why don’t we join the BRICS and start doing what we thought we should have been doing all along, which is helping to build countries around the world industrially, turning them into modern industrial nations. This is exactly what the LaRouche movement has always been committed to, which is that we have to really think in terms of using the history of America as a nation-building power instead of a nation-destroying power. So thanks very much, Graham. We’ll definitely get this report out everywhere through the Schiller Institute and EIR.

Fuller: Good. Well thank you, Mike. I really have immense respect for you, for Schiller, for you and asking these questions, promoting these issues tirelessly at a time when they hadn’t really been front and center of at least the last administration’s thinking. I think you may be getting some traction now, which is long overdue and welcome.

Billington: Yes, it’s good to see. Okay. Thank you very much.